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In this paper, I examine the processes that occur in late vision and address the problem
of whether late vision should be construed as a properly speaking perceptual stage, or
as a thought-like discursive stage. Speciﬁcally, I argue that late vision, its (partly) concep-
tual nature notwithstanding, neither is constituted by nor does it implicate what I call pure
thoughts, that is, propositional structures that are formed in the cognitive areas of the brain
through, and participate in, discursive reasoning and inferences. At the same time, the
output of late vision, namely an explicit belief concerning the identity and category mem-
bership of an object (that is, a recognitional belief) or its features, eventually enters into
discursive reasoning. Using Jackendoff’s distinction between visual awareness, which char-
acterizes perception, and visual understanding, which characterizes pure thought, I claim
that the contents of late vision belong to visual awareness and not to visual understanding
and that although late vision implicates beliefs, either implicit or explicit, these beliefs are
hybrid visual/conceptual constructs and not pure thoughts. Distinguishing between these
hybrid representations and pure thoughts and delineating the nature of the representations
of late vision lays the ground for examining, among other things, the process of concep-
tualization that occurs in visual processing and the way concepts modulate perceptual
content affecting either its representational or phenomenal character. I also do not discuss
the epistemological relations between the representations of late vision and the percep-
tual judgments they “support” or “guide” or “render possible” or “evidence” or “entitle.”
However, the speciﬁcation of the epistemology of late vision lays the ground for attacking
that problem as well.
Keywords: late vision, visual awareness, visual understanding, conceptualization, perceptual beliefs, essential
indexicals
INTRODUCTION
In earlier work (Raftopoulos, 2009), I analyzed early vision, which
I claimed is a pre-attentional visual stage unaffected by top-down
conceptual/cognitive modulation. (In what follows when I refer to
top-down processes I mean cognitively driven processes, although
there is top-down ﬂow of signals within the visual areas. In addi-
tion,where I refer to attention I mean cognitively driven attention,
unless I state otherwise.) Thus, early vision is a cognitively impen-
etrable stage of visual processing. I have related the content of
the states of early vision with the non-conceptual content (NCC)
of perception by arguing that the cognitive impenetrability of
some states and contents is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for these states and contents to be non-conceptual. I also under-
lined Pylyshyn’s (2003) distinction between early vision and late
vision. The latter is cognitively penetrated and involves the mod-
ulation of processing by either spatial or object/feature centered
attention.
In this paper, I examine the processes that occur in late vision
anddiscusswhether late vision should be construed as a perceptual
stage or as a thought-like discursive stage. I argue that late vision,
its (partly) conceptual nature notwithstanding, does not consist in
pure thoughts, that is, propositional structures that are formed in
the cognitive areas of the brain and participate in discursive rea-
soning and inferences. The content of the output of late vision, that
is, an explicit belief concerning the identity of an object (recogni-
tional belief), enters into discursive reasoning. Using Jackendoff ’s
(1989) distinction between visual awareness, which characterizes
perception, and visual understanding, which characterizes pure
thought, I claim that the contents of late vision belong to visual
awareness and not to visual understanding. Although late vision
implicates beliefs, either implicit or explicit, these beliefs are hybrid
visual/conceptual constructs and not pure thoughts. Distinguish-
ing between these hybrid representations and pure thoughts lays
the ground for examining the conceptualization of perceptual
content and the way concepts modulate it affecting either its
representational or its phenomenal character. I do not discuss
these problems here, as I do not discuss the epistemological rela-
tions between the representations of late vision and the perceptual
judgments they “support” or “evidence” or “entitle.” However, the
speciﬁcation of the epistemic status of late vision lays the ground
for attacking this problem as well.
In the ﬁrst section, I sketch early vision. Then, I discuss late
vision with an emphasis on its role in object recognition. The
purpose is to examine some of the contents and processes of
late vision and their timing. In the third section, I argue that
late vision should be considered as a perceptual rather than as
a discursive stage involving understanding, that is, a stage of
thought processing involving pure thoughts and inferences from
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propositionally structured premises to the identity of objects.
My argument is based on considerations regarding the sorts of
contents and processes formed in early and late vision.
EARLY VISION
Early vision includes a feed forward sweep (FFS) in which sig-
nals are transmitted bottom-up. In visual areas (from LGN to IT)
FFS lasts for about 100ms. It also includes a stage at which lat-
eral and recurrent processes that are restricted within the visual
areas and do not involve signals from cognitive centers occur.
Recurrent processing starts at about 80–100ms and culminates at
about 120–150ms. Lamme (2003) calls it local recurrent process-
ing (LRP). The unconscious FFS extracts high-level information
that could lead to categorization, and results in some initial fea-
ture detection. LRPproduces further binding and segregation. The
representations formed at this stage are restricted to information
about spatio-temporal and surface properties, color, texture, ori-
entation, motion, and affordances of objects, in addition to the
representations of objects as bounded, solid entities that persist in
space and time.
By not involving signals from the cognitive areas of the brain,
FFS and LRP are cognitively impenetrable/conceptually encapsu-
lated, since the transmitting of signals within the visual system
is not affected by top-down signals produced in cognitive areas.
Early vision processing is not affected directly by top-down sig-
nals from cognitive states through attention – that is, attention
does not affect the early visual processes although it may affect
pre-perceptual and post-perceptual stages of vision. I have argued
that this leads to the thesis that early vision has NCC, provided
that concepts do not ﬁgure inherently in the perceptual system, a
possibility that I have rejected (Raftopoulos, 2009). The processes
during early vision that result in states with personal-level NCC
correspond to Dretske’s (1995) phenomenal seeing1.
LATE VISION
The conceptually2 modulated stage of visual processing is called
late vision. Starting at 150–200ms, signals from higher executive
centers including mnemonic circuits intervene and modulate per-
ceptual processing in the visual cortex and this signals the onset of
global recurrent processing (GRP). In 50ms low spatial frequency
(LSF) information reaches the IT and in 100ms high spatial fre-
quency (HSF) information reaches the same area (Kihara and
Takeda, 2010). (LSF signals precede LSF signals. LSF information
is transmitted through fast magnocellular pathways, while HSF
information is transmitted through slower parvocellular path-
ways.) Within 130ms post-stimulus, parietal areas in the dorsal
system but also areas in the ventral pathway (IT cortex) seman-
tically process the LSF information and determine the gist of the
scene based on stored knowledge that generates predictions about
1In Raftopoulos (2009) I argue that a state with NCC does not have a propositional
content, and that two states cannot have the same content and one have NCC and
the other conceptual content. In this paper, I assume both theses. I also assume
that part of the NCC is content at the personal level and that one has phenomenal
awareness of that content.
2Concepts are constant, context independent, and freely repeatable elements that
ﬁgure constitutively in propositional contents; they correspond to lexical items.
the most likely interpretation of the input, even in the absence of
focal attention.
This information reenters the extrastriate visual areas andmod-
ulates (at about 150ms) perceptual processing facilitating the
analysis of HSF, for example,by specifying certain cues in the image
that might facilitate target identiﬁcation (Barr, 2009; Kihara and
Takeda, 2010; Peyrin et al., 2010). Determining the gist may speed
up the FFS of HSF by allowing faster processing of the pertinent
cues, using top-down connections to preset neurons coding these
cues at various levels of the visual pathway (Delmore et al., 2004).
Thus, at about 150ms, speciﬁc hypotheses regarding the identity of
the object(s) in the scene are formed using HSF information in the
visual brain and information from visual workingmemory (WM).
The hypothesis is tested against the detailed iconic information
stored in early visual circuits including V1. ERP’s waveforms that
distinguish scenes and objects in object recognition tasks are reg-
istered at about 150ms in extrastriate areas and are thought to
be early indices of P33 (Fabre-Thorpe et al., 2001; Johnson and
Olshausen,2005). This testing requires that top-down signals reen-
ter the early visual areas of the brain, and mainly V1. Indeed,
evidence shows that V1 is reentered by signals from higher cog-
nitive centered mediated by the effects of object/feature centered
attention at 235ms post-stimulus (Chelazzi et al., 1993; Roelfsema
et al., 1998). This leads to the recognition of the object(s) in the
visual scene. This occurs, as signaled by the P3 ERP waveform, at
about 300ms in the IT cortex, whose neurons contribute to the
integration of LSF and HSF information.
A detailed analysis of the form that the hypothesis testing
might take is provided by Kosslyn (1994). Note that one need not
subscribe to some of the assumptions presupposed by Kosslyn’s
account (see Raftopoulos, 2010 for criticism), but these disagree-
ments do not undermine the framework. Suppose that one sees
an object. A retinotopic image is formed in the visual buffer,
which is a set of visual areas in the occipital lobe that is organized
retinotopically. An attentional window selects the input from a
contiguous set of points for detailed processing. This is allowed
by the spatial organization of the visual buffer. The information
included in the attention window is sent to the dorsal and ven-
tral system where different features of the image are processed.
The ventral system retrieves the features of the object, whereas
the dorsal system retrieves information about the location, ori-
entation, and size of the object. Eventually, the shape, the color,
and the texture of the object are registered in anterior portions of
the ventral pathway. This information is transmitted to the pat-
tern activation subsystems in the IT cortex where the image is
matched against representations stored there, and the compressed
image representation of the object is thereby activated. This rep-
resentation (which is an hypothesis regarding the identity of an
object) provides imagery feedback to the visual buffer where it
is matched against the input image to test the hypothesis against
the ﬁne pictorial details registered in the retinotopical areas of
the visual buffer. If the match is satisfactory, the category pattern
activation subsystem sends the relevant pattern code to associative
3The P3waveform is elicited about 250–600ms and is generated inmany areas in the
brain and is associated with cognitive processing and the subjects’ reports. P3 may
signify the consolidation of the representation of the object(s) in working memory.
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or WM, where the object is tentatively identiﬁed with the help of
information arriving at the WM through the dorsal system (infor-
mation about, size, location, and orientation). Occasionally the
match in the pattern activation subsystems is enough to select the
appropriate representation in WM. On other occasions, the input
to the ventral system does not match well a visual memory in
the pattern activation subsystems. Then, a hypothesis is formed
in WM. This hypothesis is tested with the help of other subsys-
tems (including cognitive ones) that access representations of such
objects and highlight their more distinctive feature. The informa-
tion gathered shifts attention to a location in the image where an
informative characteristic can be found. The attention window
zooms on object’s distinctive feature, and the pattern code for it
is sent to the pattern activation subsystem and to the visual buffer
where a second cycle of matching commences.
ERP experiments registering the time onset of various wave-
forms related to speciﬁc processes in the brain largely conﬁrm this
analysis. The N2 ERP component that signiﬁes cognitively driven
spatial–attentional effects on the extrastriate cortex is registered at
about 170–200ms. Thus, by 170ms spatial attention directlymod-
ulates visual processing.However, cognitive top-downmodulation
of the extrastriate cortex, mainly V4, from the IT and parietal cor-
tex is found as early as 150ms, which, as we saw, is the ﬁrst sign of
the process of object identiﬁcation.
Eventually there is considerable competition since only few
items can enter in interactions with the higher hierarchically
processing levels. Further selection becomes necessary when sev-
eral stimuli reach the brain but only one response is possible.
Attentional selection intervenes to resolve this competition. The
selection results from the combination of bottom-up information
processing with WM and long-term memory (LTM) that recover
the meaning of input and relate it to the subject’s current goals.
In the biased competition account of attention (Desimone and
Duncan, 1995), attention is the competition between neuronal
populations that encode environmental stimuli. All the stimuli in
a visual scene are initially processed in parallel and activate neu-
ronal assemblies that represent them. These assemblies eventually
engage in competitive interactions for several reasons (when, for
example, some behaviorally relevant feature or object must be
selected among all present stimuli).
Recurrent interactions with areas outside the visual stream
make storage in visual WM possible and give rise to GRP. In GRP,
standing knowledge, that is, information stored in the synaptic
weights of the neurons is activated (becoming part of WM) and
modulates visual processing, which up to that point was concep-
tually encapsulated. Consequently, during GRP the conceptual-
ization of perceptual content starts and the states formed during
this stage have (perhaps partly) conceptual and eventually propo-
sitional contents4. This is the stage where the 3D sketch is formed,
4This means that some conceptual content in late vision may not be proposition-
ally structured, although recognitional beliefs have propositional structure. It is also
possible that some states in late vision have both NCC and conceptual content. I
will not elaborate on these issues here. Note that if some of the states of late vision
can have conceptual contents that are not propositionally structured, my thesis
that late vision does not involve inferences is strengthened because inferences relate
propositional structures.
since the recovery of the 3D sketch, that is, the representation
of an object independently of the viewer’s perspective, cannot
be the output of early vision. This recovery cannot be purely
data-driven, since what is regarded as an object depends on the
subsequent usage of the information, and thus depends on the
knowledge about objects. It follows that the formation of the 3D
sketch requires constitutively the application of concepts5. Seeing
3D sketches of objects is an instance of amodal perception, i.e.,
the representation of object parts or features that are not visible
from the viewer’s standpoint. Thus, late vision involves a synergy of
perceptual bottom-upprocessing and top-downprocessing,where
knowledge frompast experiences guides the formationof hypothe-
ses about the identity of objects present in the visual scene. Late
vision is also responsible for the experience of the 3D sketch.
There are two sorts of completion. In modal completion the
viewer has a distinct visual impression of a hidden contour or
other hidden features even though these features are not occur-
rent sensory features. The perceptual system ﬁlls in the missing
features, which thus become as phenomenally occurrent as the
occurrent sensory features of the object. In amodal completion,
one does not have a perceptual (imagination is not perception)
impression of the object’s hidden features since the perceptual
system does not ﬁll in the missing features as it happens in modal
perception; the hidden features are not perceptually occurrent.
There are cases of amodal perception that are purely percep-
tual, that is, bottom-up. In these cases, although no direct signals
from the hidden features impinge on the retina (there is no local
information available), the perceptual system can extract informa-
tion regarding them from the global information contained in the
visual scene without any cognitive involvement, as the resistance
of the ensuing percepts to beliefs indicates. However, in such cases,
the hidden features are not perceived. One simply has the visual
impression of a single concrete object that is partially occluded
and not the visual impression of various disparate image regions.
Therefore, in these perceptually driven amodal completions there
is no mental imagery involved, since no top-down signals from
cognitive areas are required for the completion, and since the
hidden features are not phenomenologically present.
There are also cases of amodal completion that are cognitively
driven (Briscoe, 2011 calls them C-completions6), such as the for-
mation of the 3D sketch of an object, in which the hidden features
of the object are represented through the top-down activation of
the visual cortex from the cognitive centers of the brain. In some
of these cases, top-down processes activate the early visual areas
and ﬁll in the missing features that become phenomenologically
present. In other cases of C-completion, the viewer simply forms
a pure thought concerning the hidden structure in the absence
of any activation of the visual areas and, thus, in the absence of
5The view that the formation of the viewer independent representation of an object
relies on object knowledge is common in theories of the formation of the 3D viewer
independent representation. Biederman (1987) thinks that object recognition is
based on part decomposition,which is the ﬁrst stage in forming a structural descrip-
tion of an object. This decomposition cannot be determined by general principles
reﬂecting the structure of the world alone, since the decomposition appears to
depend upon knowledge of speciﬁc objects.
6Briscoe’s paper analyzes Nanay’s (2010) account of the role of imagination in
amodal completion.
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mental imagery. As the latter possibility may threaten my thesis
that C-completion takes place in late vision, I discuss it in the next
section.
Before I proceed, allow me to delve on “mental imagery,” since
the way it is used may cause some confusion concerning the top-
downprocesses in late vision. Imagery is central inKosslyn’s (1994)
account of object recognition.Aswe saw,Kosslyn thinks that visual
imagery is involved in all cases of perception and covers all the
top-down ﬂaw of information either from the associative areas
of the brain or the pattern activation subsystems in the IT cor-
tex. Strawson (1974) also holds that object recognition involves
visual imagery. Discussions on amodal completion emphasize the
role of imagery in completing the hidden features by representing
them and occasionally making them phenomenologically present
even though they are perceptually absent (Nanay, 2010)7. In dis-
cussing late vision, I emphasized the role of top-down processes
that are necessary for object recognition.Now, it is well known that
many of the neural systems engaged in mental imagery are also
actively involved in the formation of the percept,most notably the
early visual areas. Since mental imagery is usually related to top-
down processes, imagery could be assimilated to late vision, which
involves top-down processes too. As mental imagery involves top-
down activation of the visual areas, it is tempting to claim that the
top-down processes in late vision are instances of visual imagery,
especially so in the case of C-completion in which the object or
feature that is represented through mental imagery is absent from
the visual scene.
To decide the issue one should deﬁne mental imagery. Usually
mental imagery is related to the mental construction of the image
of an object or feature in its absence. The image formed from
actual (perceptual) experience is called a percept to distinguish
this image from an imagined or mental image. When a subject
is asked to recall a visual object, the image formed in memory is
called a mental image. The mental image is constructed via top-
down processes (when, for example, subjects are presented with a
lower case letter and are asked to form a mental image of the upper
case letter, a task that is cognitively driven since it requires knowl-
edge of the upper case letter), while the percept is constructed
through a synergy of top-down and bottom-up processes. Thus,
mental imagery is usually construed as (i) involving only top-down
cognitively driven processes, and (ii) taking place in the absence
of the imagined object or feature. This is how I use the term.
Kosslyn (1994) and Strawson (1974), in contrast, uses the
term to designate the top-down processes in object recognition.
Kosslyn talks about imagery feedback to the visual buffer both
from the associative concept involving areas of the brain, and
the pattern activation subsystems that Kosslyn thinks store non-
conceptualized information. Therefore, mental imagery can be
either cognitively driven or data-driven, which goes against the
usual construal of mental imagery. Moreover, mental imagery is
engaged in perceptual tasks of object recognition, which means
that Kosslyn foregoes the second trait of mental imagery as
7The phenomenal/non-phenomenal distinction is orthogonal to the discussion on
mental imagery since mental imagery, exactly like perception, can either be accom-
panied by consciousness, or it can be implicit (as in implicit perception). I wish to
thank a reviewer for suggesting this.
well. Nanay (2010, pp. 244–246, 250) uses visual imagery to
account for cognitively driven amodal completion, and speciﬁ-
cally, to designate the top-downknowledge-driven effects on visual
processing.
Mental imagery is perceptually and not propositionally coded,
even though it may start with the activation of concepts in asso-
ciative memory (Kosslyn, 1994). However, the activation of the
visual areas in a top-down manner in mental imagery is not the
same as the activation of these same areas by sensory signal. For
example, the top-down induced activation in the absence of retinal
input is weaker and, thus, the modal “mode” associated with men-
tal imagery is not as strong or lively as in perception. Although it is
true that when an object is imagined as opposed to merely thought
about a number of properties must be added to the description,
these properties fall far short of all those that would be present in
perception. Not only some features may be omitted, but also pre-
cise iconic and metric information is lost in mental imagery. Since
the concepts that activate the visual cortex represent abstract cat-
egorical information, such as bright, red, and not the determinate
color say red21 (which is why one cannot recall the determinate
color of an object but only its category membership), not all visual
details of the actual visual scene can be the contents of a state of
visual imagery (Raftopoulos, 2010). In late vision, on the other
hand, the presence of the visual object allows conceptual demon-
stratives to rely on the presence of the sample and overcome any
conceptual limitations.
Since late vision constitutively involves a synergy of bottom-up
and top-down processing, whereas mental imagery, as I construe
it, involves only top-down ﬂow of information to early visual areas
in the absence of sensory stimulation, I prefer (pace Kosslyn and
Nanay) not to use “imagery” to designate the top-down activa-
tion of the visual cortex in late vision, even in those cases in which
top-down processing completes hidden features of objects. Mental
imagery differs from seeing in that it uses only the late processing
components of the perceptual system when the early processing
sensory-driven processes are unavailable (as when there is no sen-
sory stimulation). Visual imagery activates the (inactive) visual
processing areas to recreate to a certain extent a visual scene.
As such, mental imagery, unlike late vision, involves only top-
down processes. Although in both cases the early visual areas
are reentered from signals emanating from cognitive centers, in
late vision the cognitive centers are activated through bottom-
up signals from the visual cortex, while in visual imagery the
cognitive centers are activated in the absence of any sensory stim-
ulation on the retina. Thus, I think that the top-down processes
in late vision should be distinguished from mental imagery in
that the former are essentially engaged by the existence of sensory
stimuli on the retina, whereas in the latter there are no sensory
stimuli.
IS LATE VISION A VISUAL STAGE OR A DISCURSIVE
THOUGHT-LIKE STAGE?
THE PROBLEM
Jackendoff (1989) distinguishes visual awareness from visual
understanding. There is a qualitative difference between the expe-
rience of a 3D sketch and the experience of a 21/2D sketch. One
is aware of the 3D sketch or of category based representations,
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however, this is not visual awareness but some other kind of
awareness. Visual awareness is awareness of Marr’s 21/2D sketch,
which is the viewer-centered representation of the visible sur-
faces of objects, while the awareness of the 3D sketch is visual
understanding. Thus, the 3D sketch, which includes the unseen
surfaces that are not represented in the 21/2D sketch, is a result
of an inference; amodal completion is an inference. Jackendoff ’s
views belong to the so-called belief-based account of amodal com-
pletion: the 3D sketch is the result of beliefs inferred from the
object’s visible features and other background information from
past experiences.
The problem iswhether object identiﬁcation andC-completion
that occur in late vision and are both dependent on concepts
should be thought of as cases of vision or as cases of discursive
understanding involving inferences. If late vision involves concep-
tual contents and if the role of concepts and stored knowledge
consists, among other things, in providing some initial interpre-
tation of the visual scene and in forming hypotheses about the
identity of objects that are tested against perceptual information,
one is tempted to say that this stage relies on inferences (this is what
hypothesis testing amounts to) and, thus, differs in essence from
the purely perceptual processes of early vision. Perhaps it would
be better to construe late vision as a discursive stage involving
thoughts, in the way of Jackson’s (1977) epistemic seeing, where
“seeing” is used in a metaphorical non-perceptual sense, as where
one says of his friend whom she visited “I see he has left,” based on
perceptual evidence. It is, also possible that Dretske (1993, 1995)
thinks that seeing in the doxastic sense is not a visual but, rather, a
discursive stage.
Onemight object that abandoning this usage of “to see”violates
ordinary usage. A fundamental ingredient of visual experience
consists in meaningful 3D solid objects. Adopting this proposal
would mean that one should resist talking of seeing tigers and
start talking about seeing viewer-centered visible surfaces. “By this
criterion,much of the information we normally take to be visually
conscious would not be, including the 3D shape of objects as well
as their categorical identity” (Palmer, 1999, p. 649).
The arguments to common language notwithstanding, I think
that one should not assume either that late vision is an inferential
discursive stage that constitutively involves thoughts in the capac-
ity of premises in inferences whose conclusion is the content of
the states of late vision (although implicit hypotheses play a role),
or that late vision consists in discursively entertaining thoughts.
The reason is twofold. First, I think that seeing an object is not
the result of an inference, that is, a movement in thought from
some premises to a conclusion and, thus, a discursive process, even
though it involves concepts. Second, late vision is a stage in which
conceptual modulation and perceptual processes form an inextri-
cable link that differentiates late vision from discursive stages and
renders it a different sort of a set of processes than understanding,
even though late vision involves implicit beliefs regarding objects
that guide the formation of hypotheses concerning object identity,
and an explicit belief of the form “that O is F” eventually arises in
the ﬁnal stages of late vision. Late vision has an irreducible visual
ingredient, which makes it different from discursive understand-
ing. Before I discuss all these, let me clarify some terminological
issues.
Beliefs
Traditionally judgments are occurrent states, whereas beliefs are
dispositional states. To judge that O is F is to predicate Fness to O,
while endorsing the predication (McDowell, 1994). To believe that
O is F is to be disposed to judge, under the right circumstances,
that O is F. This is the ﬁrst sense in which beliefs are dispositional
items. Now, as the reader recalls, I have distinguished between
standing knowledge – information stored in LTM – and infor-
mation that is activated in WM. The belief that O is F may be
a standing information in LTM, a memory, because, say, one has
seen O to be F in the past, even though presently one does not have
an occurrent thought about O. Beliefs need not be consciously or
unconsciously recalled or apprehended in order to be possessed
by a subject, which means that beliefs are dispositional rather than
occurrent items; this is a second sense in which beliefs are disposi-
tional. When this information is activated, the occurrent thought
that O is F emerges in WM. In the literature one ﬁnds the distinc-
tion between “thought” and “standing knowledge” (Prinz, 2002, p.
148). Accordingly, all thoughts are occurrent states by being acti-
vated in WM. Thus, I use “occurrent thought” and “thought” as
synonymous.
It follows that a belief qua dispositional state may be either a
piece of standing knowledge, in which case it is dispositional in
the sense that when activated it becomes a thought, or a thought
that awaits endorsement to become a judgment, in which case the
belief is dispositional in the sense that it has the capacity to become
a judgment. In the ﬁrst case, if beliefs are stored in LTM as stand-
ing knowledge and if thoughts are occurrent states, beliefs are not
the same as thoughts although a belief when activated becomes
a thought. In the second case, a belief is a thought held in WM,
albeit one that has not been yet endorsed. There are interesting
epistemological implications but they are irrelevant here. In what
follows, I assume that beliefs are either thoughts or pieces of stand-
ing information, which have not been endorsed and, thus, are not
judgments. One might wonder how is it possible to understand
a belief as an occurrent thought that is not endorsed? An expla-
nation has to wait until I have explained why late vision does not
involve inferences.
State consciousness
It is important for the discussion that follows to clarify another
problem, namely, under which conditions are beliefs conscious or
not. An intuitive answer is that, as a matter of course, one may
entertain beliefs or judgments and use them for various purposes
(for example to draw conclusions in inferences or guide actions)
even though one is not conscious that one entertains these beliefs
or judgments (as in the case of using implicit premises in an argu-
ment); these beliefs are implicit. Underneath this intuitive view
one discerns the assumption that a state is conscious if the per-
son who has it is conscious that she is in that state. Either that
person has a second order thought that she is entertaining such
a belief – that is, she has fact-awareness that she is entertaining
that state – or she has a second order experience or inner sense
that she is in such a state – that is, she has thing-awareness of the
state – where “thing-awareness” and “fact-awareness” are used in
the way Dretske (1993) deﬁnes them. If one subscribes to this view,
what makes a mental state of a person conscious is the person’s
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awareness of the state. However, Dretske (1993) argues that what
renders a person’s state conscious is not some sort of second order
awareness that one is in such and such state, or that she is having
that state. A state is conscious
being a certain sort of representation, it makes one aware of
the properties (of x) and objects (x itself) of which it is a
sensory representation. . .[A] certain belief is conscious, not
because the believer is conscious of it (or conscious of having
it), but because it is a representation that makes one con-
scious of the fact (that P) that it is a belief about. . .beliefs
are conscious, not because you are conscious of them, but
because, so to speak, you are conscious with them (Dretske,
1993, pp. 437–438).
Beliefs that are thought of as implicit but play a cognitive role in
making a person aware of some facts or things are conscious (a
ﬁrst-order consciousness). Dretske does not claim that everything
that happens to one when one becomes conscious of some object
or event is conscious. However, a perceptual experience or a belief
has to be conscious in order for a person to be made aware of
things and events. I do not assess Dretske’s thesis, which is only
among many views on consciousness (some of which are higher-
order theories that Dretske resists), and I remain neutral as to how
conscious state should be construed. By “implicit belief” I mean
the belief held by a person who is not aware that she is having that
belief.
Inference
My claim is that the processes in late vision are not inferential
processes where “inference” is understood as discursive, that is,
as a process that involves drawing propositions–conclusions from
other propositions acting as premises by applying (explicitly or
implicitly) inferential rules that are also represented. These infer-
ences are distinguished from “inferences” as understood by vision
scientists according to whom any transformation of signals car-
rying information according to some rule is a form of inference.
“Every system that makes an estimate about unobserved variables
based onobserved variables performs inference. . .Werefer to such
inference problems that involve choosing between distinct and
mutually exclusive causal structures as causal inference” (Shams
and Beierholm, 2010).
LATE VISION, HYPOTHESIS TESTING, AND INFERENCE
I think that the states of late vision are not inferences frompremises
that include the contents of early vision states, even though it
is usual to ﬁnd claims that one infers that a tiger, for exam-
ple, is present from the perceptual information retrieved from
a visual scene. An inference relates some propositions in the form
of premises with some other proposition, the conclusion. How-
ever, the objects and properties as they are represented in early
vision do not constitute contents in the form of propositions,
since they are part of the non-propositional NCC of percep-
tion. In late vision, the perceptual content is conceptualized but
the conceptualization is not a kind of inference but rather the
application of stored concepts to some input that enters the cog-
nitive centers of the brain and activates concepts by matching
their content. Thus, even though the states in late vision are
formed through the synergy of bottom-up visual information
and top-down conceptual inﬂuences, they are not inferences from
perceptual content.
Late vision involves hypotheses regarding the identity of objects
and their testing against the sensory information stored in iconic
memory. One might think that inferences are involved since test-
ing hypotheses is an inferential process even though it is not an
inference from perceptual content to a recognitional thought. It
is, rather, an argument of the form if A and B then (conclusion)
C, where A and B are background assumptions and the hypothesis
regarding the identity of an object respectively, and C is the set of
visual features that the object is likely to have. A consists of implicit
beliefs about the features of the hypothesized visual object. If C
is what obtains in the visual areas, that is, if the predicted visual
features match those that are stored in iconic memory then the
hypothesis about the identity of the object is likely correct. How-
ever, the test basis or evidence against which these hypotheses are
tested for a match, that is, the iconic information stored in the
sensory visual areas, is not a set of propositions but patterns of
neuronal activations whose content is non-propositional.
There is nothing inference-like in this matching. It is just a
comparison between the activations of neuronal assemblies that
encode the visual features in the scene and the activations of
the neuronal assemblies that are activated top-down from the
hypotheses. If the same assemblies are activated then there is a
match. If they are not, the hypothesis fails to pass the test. This
can be done through purely associational processes of the sort
employed, say, in connectionist networks that process informa-
tion according to rules and, thus, can be thought of as instantiating
processing rules, without either representing these rules or operat-
ing on language-like symbolic representations. Since inferences are
carried out through rules that are represented in the system, and
operate on symbolic structures, the processing in a connectionist
network does not involve inferences, although it can be described
in terms of inference making. Thus, even though seeing an object
in late vision involves the application of concepts that unify the
appearances of the object and of its features under some category,
it is not an inferential process. The processes in late vision despite
their reliance on background beliefs do not entail by themselves a
recognitional belief.
Spelke (1988, p. 458)8 argues that “perceiving objects may be
more akin to thinking about the physical world than to sensing the
immediate environment.” The reason is that the perceptual sys-
tem, to solve the underdetermination problem of both the distal
object from the retinal image and of the percept from the reti-
nal image, employs a set of object principles and that reﬂect the
geometry and the physics of our environment. Since the contents
of these principles consist of concepts, and thus, the principles can
be thought of as some form of knowledge about the world, per-
ception engages in discursive, inferential processes. Against this,
I have argued (Raftopoulos, 2009) that for a variety of reasons
the processes that constrain the operations of the visual system
should not be construed as inferences. Rather, they constitute the
8Spelke echoes Rock’s (1983) views that the perceptual system combines inferen-
tially information to form the percept. For example, from visual angle and distance
information, one infers and perceives size.
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modus operandi of the perceptual system, they are hardwired in
the perceptual circuits, and they are not represented anywhere.
Being hardwired is another reason why perceptual processes
should not be assimilated to inference making. Inferences presup-
pose that the subject applies explicitly or implicitly inferential rules
that are represented in the subject. But the operations by means of
which signals are transformed from one into the other in the visual
system are not represented at all; they are just hardwired in the per-
ceptual system. For this reason, perceptual operations should not
be construed as inference rules, although they are describable in
terms of inference rules.
LATE VISION AND DISCURSIVE UNDERSTANDING
Even if I am right that seeing in late vision is not the result of a dis-
cursive inference, it is still arguable that late vision should be better
construed as a stage of discursive understanding rather than as a
visual stage. If object recognition involves forming a belief about
class-membership, even if the belief is not the result of an infer-
ence,why not say that recognizing an object is an experience-based
belief that is a case of understanding rather than vision.
Late vision is more than object recognition
A ﬁrst problem with this view is that late vision involves more
than a recognitional belief. Suppose that S sees an animal and
recognizes it as a tiger. In the parallel preattentive early vision,
the proto-object that corresponds to the tiger is being represented
amongst the other objects in the scene. The relevant activations
enter the parietal and temporal lobes, and the prefrontal cortex,
where the neuronal assemblies encoding the information about
tigers are activated and this activation spreads through top-down
signals to the visual areas of the brain where visual sensory mem-
ory stores the proto-objects extracted from the visual scene. The
cells encoding the proto-object corresponding to the animal and
its properties have their activations strengthened andwin the com-
petition against the assemblies encoding the proto-objects corre-
sponding to the other objects in the scene. After a proto-object
has been selected, the object recognition system forms hypotheses
regarding the identity of the object. However, for the subject’s con-
ﬁdence to reach the threshold that will allow her to form beliefs
about the identity of the object and report it, these hypotheses
must be tested (Treisman, 2006).
To test these hypotheses the visual system allocates resources
to features and regions that would conﬁrm or disconﬁrm the
hypotheses. Conceptual information about a tiger affects visual
processing and after some hypothesis testing the animal is recog-
nized as a tiger through the synergy of visual circuits and WM.
At this point the explicit belief “O is F” is formed. This occurs
after 300ms, when the viewer consolidates the object in WM and
identiﬁes it with enough conﬁdence to report it, which means
that beliefs are formed at the ﬁnal phases of late vision. However,
semantic modulation of visual processing and the process of con-
ceptualization that eventually leads to object recognition starts at
about 130–200ms. There is, thus, a time gap, between the onset
of conceptualization and the recognition of an object, which is a
prerequisite for the formation of an explicit recognitional belief.
As Treisman and Kanwisher (1998) observe, although the for-
mation of hypotheses regarding the categorization of objects
can occur within 130–200ms after stimulus onset (the time
depends on the saliency of the object), it takes another 100ms
for subsequent processes to bring this information into aware-
ness so that the perceiver could be aware of the presence of an
object and be able to report it. To form the recognitional belief
that “O is F,” one must be aware of the presence of an object
token and construct ﬁrst a coherent representation. This requires
the enhancement through attentional modulation of the visual
responses in early visual circuits that encode rich sensory infor-
mation in order to integrate them into a coherent representation,
which is why beliefs are delayed in time compared with the onset
of conceptualization. It follows that not all of late vision involves
explicit beliefs.
Late vision and consciousness
The beliefs involved in late vision in the form of hypotheses are not
in the stream of the perceiver’s consciousness; they are not explicit.
The processing in late vision is done automatically and is outside
both of the cognitive control of the viewer and of her awareness.
Matching an input to a stored template is not under anyone’s cog-
nitive control and is not a process of which one is aware; neither
is the determination of the gist of a visual scene. The conceptual-
ization of the content of perception is not under anyone’s control.
Furthermore, for a thought to be conscious the person who has
it must have access awareness to the contents of the thought; the
perceiver reports, as it were, the content of her thoughts to herself.
Thus, she must have some kind of a higher-order thought about
the contents of her thought. Such a higher-order thought is not
required in order to be able to recognize objects. Report aware-
ness occurs in 500ms, when the object has been categorized. This
marks a difference between late vision and thought. Most of the
contents and their transformations that occur during late vision
cannot be in the realm of awareness, although the outcome of late
vision is. Propositional inferences, by contrast, can be available to
awareness.
Late vision as a synergy of bottom-up and top-down information
processing
A third reason why the beliefs formed in late vision are partly
visual constructs and not pure thoughts is that the late stage of
late vision in which explicit beliefs concerning object identity are
formed constitutively involves visual circuits (that is, brain areas
from LGN to IT in the ventral system). Pure thought involves pri-
marily an amodal form of representation formed in higher centers
of the brain, even though these amodal representations can trig-
ger in a top-down manner the formation of mental images and
can be triggered by sensory stimulation. The point is that amodal
representations can be activated without a concomitant activation
of the visual cortex (see Prinz, 2002 notion of default concepts
that are amodal representations). Perceptual representations in
late vision, in contrast, are modal since they constitutively involve
visual areas. Thus, what distinguishes late vision beliefs and pure
thoughts is not so much their modal or amodal character (pure
thoughts can also be accompanied by some sort of phenomenol-
ogy), as the fact that the beliefs in late vision are formed through a
synergy of bottom-up and top-down activation and their mainte-
nance requires the active participation of the visual circuits. Pure
www.frontiersin.org December 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 382 | 7
Raftopoulos Epistemic status of late vision
thoughts can be activated and maintained in the absence of any
activation in visual circuits.
The constitutive reliance of late vision on the visual circuits
suggests that late vision relies on the presence of the object of
perception; it cannot cease to function as a perceptual demon-
strative that refers to the object of perception, as this has been
individuated though the processes of early vision (Raftopoulos
and Muller, 2006; Burge, 2010, p. 542). As such, late vision is
constitutively context dependent since the demonstration of the
perceptual particular is always context dependent. Thought,on the
other hand, by its use of context independent symbols, is free of
the particular perceptual context. Even though both recognitional
beliefs in late vision and pure perceptual beliefs involve concepts
(pure attributive elements Burge, 2010), the concepts function
differently in the two contexts. As Burge (2010, p. 545) claims“per-
ceptual belief makes use of the singular and attributive elements
in perception. In perceptual belief, pure attribution is separated
from, and supplements, attributive guidance of contextually pur-
ported reference to particulars. . . Correct conceptualization of a
perceptual attributive involves taking over the perceptual attribu-
tive’s range of applicability and making use of its (perceptual)
mode of presentation.”
Note that the attributive and singular elements in perception
correspond to the perceived objects and their properties and not to
concepts concerning these objects and properties. The attributive
elements (properties in perception) guide the contextual reference
to particulars (the objects of perception) since the referent in a
demonstrative perceptual reference is ﬁxed through the properties
of the referent as these properties are presented in perception –
what I have called the non-conceptual mode of presentation of
the object in perception (Raftopoulos and Muller, 2006). As such,
they belong to theNCCcontent of perception (Burge, 2010,p. 538)
Concepts enter the game in their capacity as pure attributions that
make use of the perceptual mode of presentation. Burge’s claim
that in perceptual beliefs pure attributions supplement attribu-
tions that are used for contextual reference to particulars may
be read to mean that perceptual beliefs are hybrid states involv-
ing both visual elements (the contextual attributions used for
determining reference to objects and their properties) and con-
ceptualizations of these perceptual attributives in the form of pure
attributions. In this case, the role of perceptual attributives is
ineliminable and, thus, Burge’s perceptual beliefs map onto my
recognitional beliefs of late vision. In late vision, unlike in pure
beliefs, there can be no case of pure attribution, that is, of attribu-
tion of features in the absence of perceptually relevant particulars
since the attributions are used to single out these particulars.
The concepts that ﬁgure in perceptual beliefs in late vision need
not correspond to perceptual attributives, that is, they need not be
restricted to concepts that late vision employs when it takes over
the mode of presentation of the perceptual content.Visual systems
have perceptual attributives for features such as shape, size, spa-
tial relations, color, motion, orientation, texture, and affordances
(Pylyshyn, 2003; Raftopoulos, 2009; Burge, 2010, p. 546), which
are matched (partly, because one does not have concepts for all
perceptual attributives) by the salient concepts. However, they do
not have perceptual attributives for tigers, yet one does have per-
ceptually based beliefs about tigers. They are perceptual in that
even though they do not conceptualize perceptual content and do
not take over the mode of presentation of perceptions (category
membership does not have a perceptual a mode of presentation),
they depend for their empirical applications on perceptual attribu-
tives (the concept “tiger”depends for its application on perceptual
attributives such as size, shape, and color).
I said that visual systems do not have perceptual attributives for
category membership, which means that these higher-order prop-
erties cannot be visually represented; one does not perceive, say,
tigerness, as Bayne (2009) and Siegel (2006) argue. Let me explain
this. The fact that late vision outputs recognitional beliefs that are
not pure beliefs does not entail that one has visual awareness of the
high-level properties that ﬁgure in the recognitional beliefs. The IT
cortex (which is the highest visual area) may represent objects in
3D, their 2D projections, viewer-centered representations, viewer
independent representations, whole objects, and parts of objects,
but not category membership. One has cognitive access aware-
ness (CAA) of higher-level properties. (CAA is about perceptual
content that is accessed by cognition becoming available to intro-
spection and refers to episodes of thinking about the contents of
one’s perceptual experience.) These beliefs are inextricably linked
to a perceptual context but this does not entail that there is a visual
phenomenology of category membership. It means, however, that
the belief modulates top-down the processing in the visual areas
of the brain and enhances the activation of the visible features that
knowledge of the category membership highlights. Thus, having
recognized an object affects the perception of some of its visible
features by changing their representation andphenomenology,but
onedoes not have visual awareness of high-level features of objects.
The inextricable link between thought and perception in late
vision explains the essentially contextual, in Perry’s (2001) and
Stalnaker’s (2008, pp. 78–82) sense, character of beliefs in late
vision. The proposition expressed by the belief cannot be detached
from the perceptual context in which it is believed, and cannot
be reduced to some other belief in which some third person or
objective content is substituted for the indexicals that ﬁgure in the
thought (in the way one can substitute via Kaplan’s characters the
indexical terms with their referents and get the “objective” truth-
evaluable content of the belief). The reason is that the belief is
tied to a idiosyncratic viewpoint by making use of the viewer’s
physical presence and occupation of a certain location in space
and time; the context in which an essentially indexical thought is
believed is essential to the information conveyed. There are not, to
paraphrase Stalnaker (2008, pp. 86–87), some relevant objective
facts that the person (S1) who entertains the objective thought
that purports to express the essentially indexical content has to
learn in order to entertain the same content as S2 who uses the
essentially contextual thought. This means that the way the world
is thought by S2 is different form the way the world is thought by
S1 not because there are some different facts the two thoughts are
about, but because S1’s and S2’s perspectives on the same facts are
different.
Perception individuates objects in a visual scene by assigning
object-ﬁles based primarily on spatio-temporal information. The
perception itself has the demonstrative reference force of “that
object” and, thus, perceptual objects are determined relationally
(Burge, 2010). For an object to be an object of a perceptual state
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it must stand in a certain kind of relation to that state. Being
acquainted perceptually with an object means that one is in direct
contact with the object itself and retrieves information from it and
not through a description (Burge, 1977). Perception puts one in
a de re relationship with the object (as opposed to a descriptivist
relationship). The content of an object-ﬁle is the de re mode of
presentation of the object in perception (Raftopoulos and Muller,
2006).
Since recognitional beliefs rely on the presence of the object
(reference to the object is ﬁxed through a demonstrative as in
“That x is F”), they are de re beliefs. Pure perceptual beliefs, on
the other hand, have their referents ﬁxed through a description
of the object in memory. The de re relationship to a visual object
eventually results in the formation of a de re belief about it. The
outcome of late vision is a de re belief tied into a perceptual con-
text. In contradistinction, pure thoughts and the pure attributions
they render possible can be used outside any perceptual context
and they descriptivist beliefs9.
It is sometimes argued that the main difference between
thoughts and perceptions is that perceptual experiences, unlike
thoughts, have a sensory quality to them (Dretske, 1993, p. 436).
Although the amodal character of cognitive states as opposed to
the modality-speciﬁc character of perceptions is a good place to
start, this should be qualiﬁed because thoughts are not in a sense
necessarily purely amodal since theymay be accompanied by expe-
riences that have a phenomenal character. The thought“the orange
is round and yellow”has a modality-speciﬁc content, in that when
one holds this thought, visual areas of one’s brain encoding color
and shape are also be activated (Prinz, 2002). However, things
are complicated. First, this activation does not entail that there is
visual awareness of these features. Second there is a large literature
on this issue with conﬂicting results. I am raising this issue to urge
the reader not to take in views like Dretske’s uncritically.
BELIEFS: TAKE TWO
If the recognitional beliefs formed in late vision are not endorsed
to become judgments, they are in some sense hypotheses. Sup-
pose that upon viewing a scene containing an object O, S comes to
believe that O is F. Since things may not be as they seem, S refrains
from judging that O is F; S does not endorse the content of her
perceptual belief. How is this recognitional belief different from
the hypotheses or implicit beliefs that are constructed during the
earlier stages of late vision in order to establish the identity of the
object beyond the fact that the one is explicit, while the other is
implicit?
In my view, the main difference consists in that the early
hypotheses are tested against the iconic information stored in
visual areas. This is an unconscious process that is outside the
control of the viewer who is usually aware only of the content
9In a de re belief, one retrieves information from the object itself and not through
a description. In late vision where information in WM guides the formation of
hypotheses about object identity, these hypotheses are based on descriptions in
addition to visual information, since the knowledge stored in memory is a descrip-
tion of the object. Thus, the ensuing recognitional belief is based on a combination
of information deriving from the object and from a description of it in memory. It
is not a pure de re belief.
of the winner, that is, the content of the explicit recognitional
belief. However, the recognitional belief of late vision must be
tested against a different sort of evidence in order to become a
judgment. It must be tested against other sorts of propositional
structures, that is, pure beliefs in which the predicate terms func-
tion as pure attributions. The aim of the testing is to put aside
various possible defeaters of the belief. For example, the viewer
has to decide whether she is the victim of some hallucination,
etc. The processes involved in this testing may be available to the
viewer’s consciousness, they are usually under her control, and they
have the form of inferences from propositional contents to propo-
sitional contents, unlike the processes in late vision. The viewer
tries to determine whether she should take the content of her late
vision at face value. This is why testing the recognitional belief
against other pure beliefs is a discursive process that is within the
space of reasons, whereas testing the implicit hypotheses to come
up with a recognitional belief belongs to late vision. In this sense,
the recognitional beliefs formed in late vision are at the interface
between the space of reasons and the perceptual space and, thus,
have a pivotal role to play in accounts of justiﬁcation of perceptual
judgments.
I can explain now my claim that a belief is a dispositional state
as opposed to a judgment that is an occurrent state. I tried to
express the thought that perception gives us a prima facie inclina-
tion to believe that O is F but other evidence may override this and
preclude us from forming the judgment that O is F. For example,
some illusions give us a prima facie reason to believe that O is F
but we do not endorse this because we do not believe that O is F.
Undoubtedly,whenOappears F in one’s experience,one is inclined
to form (this is what I mean by “prima facie”) the recognitional
belief that O is F. However, one need not endorse that thought.
That O appears F in one’s experience should not be equated with
one endorsing that O is F. To do that, one has to consider other rel-
evant beliefs. Thus, to transform the belief to a judgment, one has
to integrate it in the nexus of other beliefs, putting it, thus, within
the space of reasons. This is possible because the recognitional
belief already has a propositional structure.
There are two notions of belief here. The one is related to the
expression of the content of a conceptual perceptual state, the
recognitional belief, and the other is constitutively related to the
notion of judgment. The relation of the belief in the ﬁrst sense
to late vision contents is not inferential. The relation of the same
recognitional belief with the nexus of other beliefs is an inferential
relation; if endorsed, the belief becomes a judgment. The belief is,
thus, a disposition to make judgments (McDowell, 1994, p. 60),
which do not introduce some new content but simply endorse the
content of the recognitional belief.
Johnston (2006, p. 282) argues that the judgments that per-
ception outputs are not inferentially based on perceptual content.
“My judgment does not go beyond its truthmaker, which sensory
experience has made manifest. Its truth is thus guaranteed by its
origins. This is how immediate perceptual judgments often have
the status of knowledge. There is no evidence from which they
are inferred; instead they are reliable formed out of awareness
of their truth maker, often in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary.” Johnston talks about immediate perceptual judgments,
whereas I talk about recognitional beliefs that may or may not
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become judgments. Johnston’s view that perceptual judgments are
not inferred from perceptual evidence is correct. Our difference
stems from considerations pertaining to the sentence “often in
the absence of evidence to the contrary.” I have claimed that to
examine possible evidence against a recognitional belief, the belief
must be inferentially tested against other pure beliefs (perceptual
or otherwise). Only when it passes the test it becomes a judgment.
Thus, I qualify Johnston’s view that perceptual judgments are not
inferred from any evidence, by distinguishing between perceptual
beliefs and perceptual judgments and by adding that the former
are not inferred from any evidence as outputs of late vision, but
to become judgments they have to enter into inferential relations
with possible defeaters.
I do not claim that recognitional beliefs are always tested this
way to become judgments. Under normal conditions they are not
tested at all. One might argue, however, that the absence of testing
means that the viewer thinks that there is no reason to doubt the
recognitional belief, which in itself is a sort of implicit inference.
Or, one might think that in these normal cases, the recognitional
belief becomes automatically a judgment without any inferential
involvement. Still, the distinction holds because on certain occa-
sions the recognitional belief is inferentially tested against other
beliefs in order to become a judgment and, thus, recognitional
beliefs and perceptual judgments belong to different categories,
the ﬁrst being a state that has the potential to become a judg-
ment, even if the potentiality is actualized on certain occasions
automatically.
LATE VISION AND AMODAL COMPLETION
Nanay (2010) thinks that mental imagery is necessary to account
for amodal completion. He also (Nanay, 2010, p. 252) thinks that
amodal completion in some cases is accompanied by some sort
of phenomenology subserved by the activation of the early visual
areas. In this sense, the hidden parts and features of an object
are not merely believed in but are present in the object of per-
ception as actualities by being imagined. Moreover, even in cases
of amodal completion that are not accompanied by some sort of
phenomenology, the hidden parts or features are perceptually rep-
resented. This is good point to delineate further the distinction
between visual awareness and visual understanding and why late
vision is a case of visual awareness. Briscoe (2011, pp. 165–167),
argues that although imagery is sufﬁcient for amodal completion,
it is not necessary since one could either C-complete a visual scene
by forming beliefs about the hidden parts of an object based on
its visible features without projecting a mental image (the belief-
based account of C-completion), or one could amodally complete
a scene in bottom-up perceptual ways, in the way explained in the
third section10.
Briscoe (2011) remarks that there are cases of C-completion,
for example, the 3D sketch of an object whose backsides are hid-
den from view, which are cognitively driven in that to complete
the hidden parts the viewer must draw from object knowledge.
This may produce activation of the visual cortex, such that one
has a mental image of the hidden parts, or it may produce simply
10Note that Nanay (2010, p. 244) seems to talk about a perceptually driven amodal
completion that is insensitive to other beliefs.
a thought that there are some parts hidden from view without any
mental images, or it may produce both (Briscoe, 2011, p. 158).
If the visual cortex is involved in C-completing the picture there
is a synergy of bottom-up and top-down processes. 3D comple-
tion occurs in late vision where certain visual processing areas are
activated.
If C-completion involves a pure perceptual thought about the
hidden parts that results from an inference based on past expe-
rience and the current visual evidence, this is a case of visual
understanding and not of visual awareness. I do not think that
this possibility undermines my thesis that seeing the 3D sketch
takes place in late vision. First, it is not clear whether there is
empirical evidence for C-completion through pure thought and
in the absence of any activation in visual areas. Second, if there are
such cases, this only shows that sometimes C-completion does not
occur in late vision but in discursive reasoning. Third, Briscoe’s
example from which he argues that C-completion may involve a
pure thought involves a picture of the backside of what looks like a
horse. In this case C-completion takes the form of a pure thought
that this is a horse without any visual awareness. This is clearly
a case of an inference involving visual understanding that occurs
in the space of reasons and not in late vision. My claim is, on the
other hand, that seeing the 3D sketch is a case of C-completion
that takes place in late vision and involves visual awareness. Thus,
even if there are cases of C-completions through pure thoughts,
there are sorts of C-completions, such as seeing the 3D sketch, that
take place in late vision and are cases of visual awareness.
Consider the white surface of a wall seen in a shadow and per-
ceived as gray. Even though the viewer knows that the gray shade is
caused by the shadow cast on awhite wall, the phenomenal charac-
ter of her experience is that of gray. The phenomenal character of
her experience of the situation dependent color property (Schel-
lenberg, 2008) or the phenomenal property (Shoemaker, 2006) is
gray not white. Of course, being aware of the shadow she could
infer the intrinsic (Schellenberg, 2008) or objective (Shoemaker,
2006) color of the wall but this is an inference based on the visi-
ble grayness, knowledge of the effects of shadows on surfaces, etc.
In this case, one does not perceive the whiteness in any sense of
“seeing” and, thus, the output of late vision is not the belief that
the color of the wall is white. That the wall is experienced in late
vision as gray is a case of visual awareness, where the concomitant
belief takes over the mode of presentation of the object of expe-
rience. One may form the judgment that the wall is white even
though it looks gray, but this representation is in the realm of pure
thought. It is a case of visual understanding, a process in which
one draws a conclusion based on the evidence of one’s senses and
other relevant information.
Suppose now that one sees one’s hand moving back and forth.
One sees the hand having the same size, a case of size constancy. If
the constancy is due to cues that are available in the retinal image,
the viewer is phenomenally aware of the same size despite differ-
ences in the viewing conditions. If size constancy is not effectuated
through visual information and cognitive sources are needed, it is
achieved in late vision; the viewer believes that the size is constant
and has the phenomenal experience of a constant size. Should
visual information be insufﬁcient for perceptual constancies and
should the non-visual information that ensures constancy be not
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available (as where attention is diverted elsewhere), the viewer
would be aware of changes in size. This is what Epstein and Broota
(1986) showby demonstrating thatwhen attention is directed else-
where, the size constancy operations fail. Thus, the experience of a
stable size is the product of late vision, created by the knowledge of
the size and stability of our hand in synergy with visual informa-
tion coming from the hand. There is a large amount of literature
supporting the view that many a perceptual constancy rely on
object knowledge (Granrud, 2004; Cohen, 2008; Hatﬁeld, 2009).
Despite the role of thoughts in late vision, these cases should be
better construed as visual awareness and not as visual understand-
ing because, ﬁrst, the states of late vision do not consist in pure
thoughts but in hybrid states and, second, because the processes
that lead to perceptual constancies are not discursive inferences.
To recapitulate, in pure thought the beliefs formed result from
discursive processes (which may include perceptual information
cast in a propositional form) and their attributives are context free,
while in late vision there are no discursive processes but only con-
ceptuallymodulated visual processing and the relevant attributives
are context bound. These differences result from the constitu-
tive involvement in late vision of visual circuits, an involvement
that is absent in pure thought. This view entails that in amodal
completion, which is one of the processes that take place in late
vision, the missing or occluded features are nor represented by
pure perceptual beliefs, a view that is also supported by (par-
tially) independent considerations offered by Nanay (2010, pp.
243–246).
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Some philosophers consider that there is a sharp distinction
between vision and thought and attempt to explain various phe-
nomena (such as modal and amodal completion, or cognitive
effects on perception) either (exclusive“either. . .or”) as perceptual
or thought-based.McPherson (in press) considers evidence for the
effects of knowledge of the colors of objects on the perception of
these colors and after having rejected a thought-based explanation
of these effects goes on to argue that knowledge affects perception
itself through the processes of mental imagery and, consequently
that perception is cognitively penetrable. The main reason that at a
last analysis drives McPherson to conclude that color perception is
cognitively penetrable is that cognition affects the phenomenology
of the way colors look and this cannot be explained by a belief-
based account but only by admitting that it is the perceptual stage
itself that is cognitively effected.However, if one allows for the pos-
sibility of a stage of visual processing in which visual processing
and cognitive effects coexist and, consequently, allows for a stage
of visual processing that is cognitively penetrated and has its own
phenomenology, one can explain the cognitive effects on visual
phenomenology without drawing the conclusion that all visual
processes are cognitively penetrable, since early vision may still be
cognitively impenetrable. There is a hybrid stage of vision/thought
in which perception and cognition are intermingled. This is the
cognitively penetrated stage of late vision. Since late vision does
not involve pure thoughts, the belief-based accounts are wrong but
that does not entail that early vision is cognitively penetrable.
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